In this paper, a collective discrete choice model is presented for female labour supply. Both preferences of females and the intrahousehold decision process are econometrically identifiable. The model incorporates nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation. It is applied to Belgian microdata and is used to evaluate the 2001 Tax Reform Act. We find moderate negative behavioural responses to the reform. The tax reform further implies a Pareto improvement for most of the households in the sample.
Introduction
Usually, evaluations of the impact of tax reforms on employment and hours of work are cast in the unitary framework. In this framework, it is assumed that households, even if they consist of several individuals, behave as if they were single decision making units. Recent examples of such tax reform evaluations are Hoynes (1996) and Blundell et alii (1999) . One important deficiency of the unitary approach from a welfare economic point of view is that it is not able to say anything on the intrahousehold allocation of welfare. Apps and Rees (1988) and Brett (1998) have shown, however, that intrahousehold distributional issues can in general not be ignored in normative welfare analyses. Another shortcoming of the approach is that its theoretical implications seem to be overly restrictive. As a consequence, they were repeatedly rejected when confronted with household labour supply data (see Fortin and Lacroix, 1997 for some recent evidence).
A valuable alternative to the unitary approach is the collective approach to household behaviour. This approach, which was introduced by Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 ) and Apps and Rees (1988) , takes account of the fact that multi-person households consist of several individuals who have their own preferences. It is assumed that these individuals are involved in an intrahousehold bargaining process that results in Pareto efficient intrahousehold allocations. The collective approach implies other behavioural restrictions than the unitary model (see, e.g., Chiappori, 1988 , 1992 and Browning and Chiappori, 1998 . Contrary to the unitary model's restrictions, these testable implications of the collective model turn out to be less restrictive (see references in Vermeulen, 2002a) . Moreover, the specific setting of the collective model allows to analyse the intrahousehold welfare distribution under some additional assumptions (see Chiappori, 1988 Chiappori, , 1992 . Clear evidence of conflicting outcomes of the unitary and collective approach with respect to welfare evaluations of tax reforms is given in the different contributions of Laisney (2002) .
Gradually, many topics in the labour supply literature are translated into a collective setting. Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) derive collective restrictions and identification results with respect to individual preferences and the intrahousehold distribution process. These studies do not take into account taxation and nonparticipation. In Blundell et alii (2001) , testable implications and identification results are derived for a collective labour supply model that allows for both nonparticipation and unobserved preference heterogeneity. Nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation are dealt with in Donni (forthcoming). Under some additional assumptions, identification of a great deal of individual preferences and the intrahousehold distribution process is possible. The model, without nonparticipation, has been applied in Moreau and Donni (2002) .
As far as we know, the only empirical studies that tackle both nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation are the contributions in Laisney (2002) . In these studies, household labour supply is modelled as a discrete choice problem. In other words, individuals are assumed to have the choice between a discrete set of labour supply options. This approach, which is rather popular nowadays, allows to incorporate very general nonlinear and nonconvex tax schemes (see, Van Soest, 1995, Bingley and Walker, 1997, Keane and Moffitt, 1998 and Blundell et alii, 1999 for some examples). In Laisney (2002) , individual preferences and the intrahousehold allocation process are identified, in a piecemeal way, by means of both econometric estimation and calibration techniques.
The aim of this paper is to present a collective and econometrically identifiable discrete choice model for female labour supply. The model is fairly general in that it incorporates both nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation. The focus on female choice behaviour is driven by the empirical observation that almost all men in the sample we are using work full time. Their contractual working hours typically reflect the number of hours that are worked in many economic sectors. Preferences of women in couples are fully identified by assuming that their preferences are egoistic and identical to those of single women with similar characteristics. Note that the assumption of egoistic preferences of individuals in couples, and the equality of these preferences to single women's preferences, is a restriction of the preferences assumed in Laisney (2002) . In the latter study, externalities within a household with respect to labour supply were allowed. A comparable assumption to this paper's was made in Barmby and Smith (2001) . Their model, however, does not take into account nonlinear taxation and nonparticipation issues. To reduce the restrictiveness of the assumption to the min-imum, we focus on childless single women and couples. It will be shown that the model allows for richer behavioural implications than the unitary model. Moreover, it is able to say something on who gets what in the household. Consequently, normative welfare analyses can be done at the individual level, rather than at the household level. The model is applied to Belgian microdata. The sample selection is for individuals that are working or voluntarily unemployed. Students, self-employed, involuntarily unemployed and retired people are excluded from the dataset. The model will be used as a basis for an evaluation of the impact on employment, hours and individual consumption of the Belgian 2001 Tax Reform Act. This reform is to be implemented between the years 2001 and 2004 and implies some important changes with respect to the current tax system.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the economic model that is cast in a collective framework. In Section 3 a short description of the current Belgian tax system is given. It also covers the main features of the 2001 Tax Reform Act. Section 4 discusses the data and presents model estimates. Tax reform simulation results are given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The economic model 2.1 A sharing rule interpretation
We consider households that consist of two working age individuals (m and f ) and female singles. Labour supply of single men and of men in couples is assumed to be fixed at full time working hours. Empirical evidence for this assumption is given in Section 4. Note that the assumption is also supported by Pencavel (1986) who concludes that male labour supply is rather insensitive to changes in economic variables like wages and nonlabour income. We further assume that preferences of individuals in couples are egoistic (see Chiappori, 1988) . In other words, utility is derived only from own consumption and leisure. Moreover, we assume that preferences of women in couples are identical to those of female singles. Both assumptions may seem restrictive. It can be argued, however, that these assumptions are not that restrictive if we focus on childless couples. When there are (younger) children in the household, their preferences are probably internalized in the preferences of the adults in the household. External effects with respect to leisure may also be more important for couples with children.
1
Preferences of females are represented by the following well-behaved direct utility function:
where c f denotes the female's private consumption of a Hicksian aggregate commodity, l f is leisure and d f is a vector of demographic characteristics (e.g., age and education level). Budget constraints for female singles and couples are respectively equal to:
and
where w i is individual i's gross hourly wage rate,`i is individual i's labour supply (`i = T − l i , where T is total time available), c m is the male's private consumption, y is nonlabour or other income and τ f and τ c are tax functions that capture the income tax which in general depends on earned incomes, other income and demographic characteristics. Let us denote total household means by x.
In the collective approach, it is assumed that individuals in couples choose Pareto efficient allocations (see Chiappori, 1988 Chiappori, , 1992 . It is a well-known result that if preferences are of the egoistic type, then any Pareto efficient allocation can be represented as a price equilibrium with transfers (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et alii, 1995). This can be interpreted as a two stage budgeting process, where household members first divide total household consumption among themselves. In a second step, each individual maximizes her or his own utility subject to an individual budget constraint. In our setting with fixed male labour supply, this amounts to the following maximization problem:
subject to
where φ is a function which determines the part of total household consumption x that is transferred to the woman in the couple. Following Chiappori (1988) , let us call φ the sharing rule. 2 In general this sharing rule will depend on a number of variables z that influence an individual's bargaining power in the household. In Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , individual wages and other income act as such variables. However, in a setting with nonlinear income taxation these variables seem to be less adequate. In the empirical exercise we will make use of a variable that already proved useful in the different contributions in Laisney (2002) . It captures the earning capacity of the female in the household. The variable is defined as the difference between total household consumption when the female works full time and total household consumption when she does not participate in the labour market. This variable thus incorporates elements related to her productivity and elements related to the nonlinear tax system. How can we now identify both preferences of females, as represented by v f , and the sharing rule, as represented by φ, in an efficient way? Note that in labour supply datasets, only total household consumption (net income) is observed, and not the private consumption levels c m and c f . This rules out a direct estimation of females' preferences by means of the variables c f and`f , via a discrete choice model for instance.
One possibility to identify preferences and the sharing rule is the following. Firstly, the assumption was made that preferences of females in couples equal those of single women. Preferences of the latter group are identified in the standard way since the unitary approach is fully applicable to singles. Secondly, by merging both datasets of women and adequately redefining a budget constraint for the maximization problem (4), one can in principle identify preference parameters and sharing rule parameters simultaneously. In the next subsection, it will become clearer how the identification result is implemented. Since we assumed equal preferences for both single women and women in couples, all preference and sharing rule elements are identifiable. This is the main difference between this approach and the results derived by Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 and Donni (forthcoming). In the latter studies, which only make use of information in a couples dataset, the sharing rule is identified up to an additive constant, whereas preferences are identified up to a translation.
Empirical specification of the model
We opt for a discrete choice model for female labour supply. This approach, which was introduced by Van Soest (1995), assumes that individuals can choose between a limited number of labour supply options. The specific setting allows to incorporate very general (e.g., nonlinear and noncontinuous) tax schemes. The optimization problem consists of comparing the different utility levels associated with each of the available hours choices and choosing that one which yields the highest utility.
Let us assume that females have J labour supply choices, each choice associated with a particular consumption level. Preferences of women are assumed to be representable by a restricted version of the quadratic direct utility function (see Stern, 1986 ). The utility that woman i derives from labour supply choice j is given by:
where`f ij = T − l f ij and ε ij is an unobserved preference component that is assumed to be distributed as a type I extreme value random variable. The preference parameters β``³d f i´a nd β`³d f i´a re assumed to be heterogeneous across individuals and are of the following form:
Following Train (1998) , an extra source of unobserved preference heterogeneity across individuals is introduced via the disturbances υ``i and υ`i. These are assumed to be mean zero normally distributed:
As has been demonstrated by McFadden (1974) , if the disturbances ε ij are independent and identically distributed with type I extreme value distribution, then the probability that individual i opts for labour supply choice k, given disturbances υ``i and υ`i, equals:
where z i is a random variable which indicates the choice made. The corresponding unconditional probability equals:
The likelihood function of this random parameters logit model equals:
where d ij is a binary variable which equals 1 if individual i has opted for labour supply choice j and 0 otherwise. Estimates of the structural preference parameters and variances of unobserved preference components σ 2 υ``a nd σ 2 υ`c an be obtained by means of simulated maximum likelihood methods (see Train, 1998) .
Necessary elements for the application of a discrete choice model are the individual consumption levels c f ij associated with the different labour supply choices. For female singles, these consumption levels are observed, given gross wage rates (observed for participants, estimated for nonparticipants), other income, individual characteristics and the tax system. As already mentioned, private consumption levels of women in couples are not observed. We know, however, that the female's private consumption at the j'th labour supply choice c f ij equals the share of total household consumption x ij which is allocated to her by means of the sharing rule φ. Let us assume that this sharing rule is of the following linear form:
where z i is the female's earning capacity (cf. supra), and κ 1 and κ 2 are parameters that are to be estimated.
3 Note that 0 < 1 + κ 1 + κ 2 z i < 1. By making use of a dummy variable s i which indicates whether woman i is single (s i = 0) or living in a couple (s i = 1), we can define a budget constraint that is simultaneously applicable to both single women and women in couples:
Substituting equation (12) for c f ij in equation (5), we obtain the following 'collective' female utility function with observable regressors:
Application of this structural form in a random parameters logit model results in the direct identification of the parameters β``³d
By means of these estimates, we can derive the sharing rule parameters:
Equations (14) and (15) imply two testable restrictions of this collective labour supply model. The underlying idea is that the female's private consumption can only change via the sharing rule that allocates total household consumption to both household members. Since the female's private consumption occurs twice in the given functional form, the sharing rule should twice have the same effect on female consumption. Note that these restrictions are implied by the specific functional form rather than by the collective approach as such. It is also clear from equations (13), (14) and (15) that the assumption of equal preferences for single women and females in couples is necessary for the identification of both female preferences and the sharing rule. Without it, preferences and the sharing rule cannot be disentangled.
4
Apart from the above collective restrictions, the model implies also the standard unitary restrictions on the female's utility function. These restrictions boil down to the utility function (5) being (strictly) quasi-concave, monotone increasing in consumption c f and monotone decreasing in labour supply`f . This implies the following restrictions on the parameters for all ¡ c f ,`f ¢ :
Note that the last two restrictions depend on the unobserved disturbances coming from the assumed preference heterogeneity across individuals. One possibility is a test of these restrictions for the expected value of the parameters β``¡d
3 The Belgian tax-benefit system and the 2001 Tax Reform Act
The Belgian tax-benefit system
In the empirical exercise, we will focus on a simplified tax-benefit system. Firstly, information on many items that affect the tax liability of households is lacking in the dataset that will be used. Examples of such items are contributions to private pension funds and capital redemptions due to mortgage loans. Secondly, given the selected sample for the empirical exercise, we can safely restrict attention to tax rules that are applicable to labour incomes and ignore rules on incomes coming from, e.g., pensions and unemployment benefits. Also child benefits do not have to be taken into account, since we focus on childless households. We will only sketch the tax system that is applicable to the selected sample. A more elaborate discussion of the Belgian tax-benefit system can be found in Vermeulen (2002b) . The simplified tax scheme for the year 2000 that is used for the sample of single women consists of four main components. These are (1) the social security tax that is to be paid by employees, (2) the standard deductions, (3) the marginal tax rate scheme and (4) the standard tax credits. The social security tax is equal to a constant rate of 13.07% which is applied to gross labour income. In a next step, standard expenses are deducted from labour income net of social security contributions at a decreasing marginal rate ranging from 20% on the first 4,165 euros to 3% on the bracket up to 55,470 euro. After these standard deductions, the marginal tax rate scheme is applied to taxable labour income. This marginal tax rate scheme consists of seven marginal tax rates, ranging from 25%, applied to the first 6,400 euros, to 55% for the taxable labour income above 61,230 euro. This operation results in the gross tax liability. Net tax liability is obtained by subtracting the appropriate tax credits. The first tax credit is that related to the basic exemption from income taxation. For a single, this exemption equals about 5,200 euro. If taxable labour income is higher than this exemption, a credit of about 1,300 euro is obtained. Next to this tax credit, there is the tax credit related to family size. Since the households in the selected sample are childless, this credit can be ignored in the empirical exercise. Finally, there is a negative tax credit related to the temporary crisis surcharge.
5 After application of the other tax credits, an extra tax rate of 3% is applied to the resulting tax liability. The tax scheme for married couples differs from the above tax scheme in two respects. Firstly, married individuals can make use of the so-called 'marital quotient' if some conditions are satisfied. This tax rule allows to shift a part of the taxable labour income of one of the spouses to the other spouse. In our simplified tax scheme, couples are allowed to make use of this marital quotient if the taxable labour income of the spouse with the lowest earnings does not exceed 30% of the joint taxable labour income. The part that is shifted to the spouse with lowest earnings equals 30% of joint taxable labour income, minus the own taxable labour income of that spouse. It has a maximum of about 7,500 euro however. A second main difference between the tax scheme for singles and couples, is the basic exemption that is related to the tax credit. This exemption equals about 4,140 euro for each spouse.
The 2001 Tax Reform Act
In August 2001, the new Tax Reform Act was proclaimed. This reform is to be implemented over the period 2001 to 2004 and implies some relatively sweeping changes of the current tax system. According to the government, the cost of this reform is estimated at 3.25 billion euro or 10.7% of the amount generated in 2001 by the personal income tax system net of the temporary crisis surcharge (see Reynders, 2000) . There are four main measures that are important for the selected sample in the empirical exercise.
The first important change in comparison to the current tax system, is the introduction of a refundable tax credit for the lowest labour incomes. A tax credit of about 620 euro will be given to individuals with a labour income (after deduction of social security contributions and deductions for professional expenses) between about 3,700 and 12,400 euro. Eligible working individuals that do not pay taxes or pay less taxes than this credit receive an extra income equal to the difference between the credit and the taxes paid. Individuals that participate in the labour market and earn less or more than the above boundaries may be eligible to a reduced tax credit. According to the government, the objectives of this in-work tax credit is to improve work incentives by making work pay and to better the income position of some working individuals.
A second feature of the tax reform is the broadening of the middle tax brackets and the lowering of the two highest marginal tax rates from 52.5% and 55% to 50%. This measure is introduced to decrease the fiscal pressure on respectively the middle and the highest incomes.
A third measure is that the tax exemption of married individuals and singles will be equalized. In the current system, the tax exemption of married individuals and, possibly cohabiting, singles differ. This exemption is to be brought at the higher singles' level.
Finally, the marital quotient will also be applicable to (unmarried) individuals with a cohabitation contract.
Data and empirical results

Data
The data is drawn from the 1992 and 1997 Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) of the Center for Social Policy (University of Antwerp). This panel is representative for the Belgian population and is primarily used for research of poverty issues, the effectiveness of social security and the welfare distribution.
Two samples are selected for the empirical exercise. The first sample consists of female singles without children, aged between 25 and 55 inclusive and who are employed or voluntarily unemployed. Students, self-employed, unemployed and retired people are excluded from the dataset. The second sample consists of married or de-facto couples subject to the same sample selection as single females. The sample sizes are respectively 128 and 340 for female singles and couples. 6 Note that hourly gross wage rates are unobserved for individuals that do not participate in the labour market. These wages are estimated by means of Heckman's two step estimation procedure (see Vermeulen, 2002b for more detailed results).
In Tables 1 and 2 summary statistics on both selected samples are given. Histograms on weekly contractual hours of singles and individuals in couples are given in Figures 1-4. 7 As is clear from Figures 2 and 4 , labour supply of men is highly concentrated around 38 hours. Only a small fraction of men have a contractual labour supply that deviates from this mode. Moreover, there are no men who are not working for the selected sample. This fleshes out the assumption made earlier that all men work full time. Labour supply of women has a larger variance. Figures 1 and 3 clearly show that an important fraction of the females do not participate in the labour market. This fraction is higher for women in couples than for singles. A not unimportant fraction of the females is working part-time, with peaks around 20 and 30 hours.
In the empirical exercise, we will assume that women have the following discrete choice set:`f ∈ {0, 20, 30, 38}. For each of these weekly hours choices, the corresponding household net income (i.e., total household consumption) is calculated. This net income depends on the individuals' gross hourly wages, the household's nonlabour income and the tax system. 6 Individuals with wages below or above the 1 and 99 percentiles of the wage distribution were also excluded. 7 The sample of single males is subject to the same sample selection rules as those for single females. 
Empirical results
The second column of Table 3 reports unrestricted estimates of the model for female labour supply (see equation (13)). According to a likelihood ratio test, the conditional logit model (in other words, model without unobserved preference heterogeneity with respect to ¡`f ¢ 2 and`f ) cannot be rejected. Twice the difference between the log likelihood of the restricted model and the log likelihood of the unrestricted model equals 0.05. This test statistic is to be compared to the critical value χ 2 0.05 (2) = 5.99. Let us now turn attention to the explanatory variables that are specific to the collective approach. Two variables related to the dummy for couples are significantly estimated at the 5% significance level. This can be interpreted as a rejection of a standard unitary model for female labour supply where other income consists of both nonlabour income and the male's earnings. Important with respect to the above collective model, is that a Wald test cannot reject the restrictions (14) and (15) . The test statistic equals 4.39 and is lower than the critical value χ strictions were tested by checking whether they are satisfied for all observations in the sample. 8 Contrary to the above collective restrictions, results are not quite satisfying. Monotonicity with respect to consumption is not satisfied for the 30 and 38 hours choices. For 54% of the checked labour supply choices, the marginal utility of labour is positive. The concavity restriction is not satisfied for 55% of the checked labour supply choices. 9 Since these unitary rejections are problematic from a policy evaluation point of view, we re-estimated the model with monotonicity with respect to consumption and the collective restrictions imposed. 10 The estimation results are reported in the third column of Table  3 . Quite interestingly, the number of correctly predicted labour supply choices increased rather dramatically. However, as could be expected, the imposed restrictions are rejected by means of a likelihood ratio test. The test statistic of 20 is higher than the critical value χ (14) and (15), we can derive the sharing rule parameters κ 1 and κ 2 . These are respectively equal to -0.77919 and 0.00076. This implies the following sharing rule for the j'th hours choice of individual i (see equation (11)):
Standard errors of the coefficients in the sharing rule are respectively equal to 0.03416 and 0.00012. The share of total household consumption that is shifted to the woman in a couple is thus positively, and significantly, related to her earning capacity. By means of this sharing rule, we can estimate the private consumption going to the woman, given her earning capacity and the total household consumption (see next section).
Policy simulations
In this section, we focus on both a positive and normative analysis of the Belgian 2001 Tax Reform Act. As has already been mentioned, a main advantage of the collective approach is that it is able to identify gainers and losers of the tax reform at the individual level, rather than at the household level. In other words, intrahousehold distributional issues can be considered. In general, two types of behavioural responses to the tax reform will come into play. The first effect is due to the fact that the tax reform implies an expansion of all household budget sets. In other words, for each labour supply choice, a higher net income 8 The restrictions were tested for all four labour supply choices, taking into account the corresponding consumption levels, for each observation (both singles and women in couples). This amounts to checking the restrictions for 4 × 468 = 1872 labour supply choices. Strictly speaking, restrictions that involve the consumption level c f (notably, the monotonicity restriction with respect to labour supply and the quasi-concavity restriction) should be satisfied for all nonnegative consumption levels. 9 The model was also applied to the subsample of single women (to which the unitary approach should be fully applicable). Monotonicity with respect to consumption was rejected for the 38 hours labour supply choice. Monotonicity with respect to labour was rejected for 25% of the checked labour supply choices. Concavity was rejected in 87% of the cases. 10 Monotonicity with respect to consumption is imposed by means of the linear restriction β c = −β c`· 38. This implies that the collective restrictions can be imposed by the restrictions β * c1 = −β * c`1 · 38 and β * c2 = −β * c`2 · 38 (cf. supra). Note that monotonicity with respect to labour supply and quasi-concavity cannot be imposed without losing the flexibility of the behavioural model. All parameter estimates and standard errors (between brackets) are multiplied by 1000. Education dummy 1: 1 = secondary schooling (primary schooling benchmark). Education dummy 2: 1 = non academic higher education. Education dummy 3: 1 = academic higher education. Region dummy 1: 1 = Walloon Region (Flemish Region benchmark). Region dummy 2: 1 = Brussels Capital Region. Dummy couple: 1 = couple (single woman is benchmark). Earning capacity is the difference between the household's disposable income when the female is working full time and when she does not participate. Prediction of the labour supply for an observation is obtained by selecting the hours choice with the highest probability.
is obtained after the tax reform. The impact of the reform on the individuals' labour supply and consumption will depend on the standard interaction between income and substitution effects. This is not the end of the story, however, since the reform may also imply a change of the bargaining position of the individuals in couples, which is captured by the sharing rule. This alteration entails an impact on both the magnitude and the allocation of total household consumption to the household members. It implies an extra behavioural effect on top of the standard effects that are incorporated in the unitary approach. Tables 4 and 5 give some summary statistics based on the pre and post reform simulations for respectively couples and single females. The effect of the tax reform is rather moderate: average labour supply is decreased by about 3.75% for women in couples and by about 0.3% for single women after implementation of the tax reform. Although this implies a decrease of gross earnings, the private consumption of males and females in couples is increased after the reform. The percentage increase of the women's consumption, however, is on average greater than the males', since the average bargaining power of women (as measured by the sharing rule) is slightly increased after the reform. This share, however, is not increased for all women, since some women's earning capacity is lowered after the reform. This is clearly seen in Figure 5 , where quite some observations are below the diagonal. Note that the earning capacity is the result of a fairly complex interaction between the male's and female's earnings. Going somewhat further than a pure positive description of the aggregate impact of the reform, under strong measurability and interpersonal comparability assumptions the utility of women is increased on average. This is the case both for singles and women in couples. In Tables 6 and 7 , simulated labour supply responses to the tax reform are shown for women in couples and single females. As is clear from the tables, responses are rather moderate. Most of the women in couples remain on the status quo position (i.e., 96.8% are on the diagonal in Table 6 ). Women who change their labour supply were mainly working full time before the tax reform. Ten of these women opt for leaving the labour market after the reform. The impact of the reform on the singles' labour supply is also not very pronounced. The percentage of singles that do not change their labour supply equals 95.3%. Note that two single women enter the labour market after implementation of the tax reform. Contrary to women in couples, no single woman leaves the labour market after the reform. Note that the tax reform (and especially the introduction of a refundable tax credit) does not increase the global participation rate of women. Note: Rows are pre reform labour supply, columns post reform. Table 8 shows the numbers of gainers and losers of the tax reform for individuals in couples and singles. As is clear from the table, the tax reform implies a Pareto improvement for the majority of the couples: both individuals' utility levels are increased after the reform.
11 For 11 couples, the woman's welfare is increased, while the man's welfare is decreased by the reform. In 35 cases, the male is better off after the reform, while the female is worse off. There are no households where both members are worse off after the reform. Note that this kind of results at the individual level is impossible when modelling household labour supply behaviour by means of a unitary model. Given the expansion of the budget sets by the tax reform, it is hardly surprising that almost all singles strictly gain from the reform. Table 9 provides an inequality analysis with respect to private consumption on an individualistic basis over both single females and individuals in couples. The inequality measures used in this analysis belong to the generalized entropy class. These measures are defined as follows (see Foster and Sen, 1997): where n is the number of individuals in the analysis, c i individual i's private consumption, c an n-vector of private consumption levels, µ the average private consumption and α an inequality aversion parameter. If α equals 1 or 0, we respectively have Theil's entropy measure and Theil's second inequality measure or mean logarithmic deviation:
Parameter α indicates the sensitivity of the associated inequality measure to transfers at different parts of the distribution. It can be shown that all measures with α < 2 favour transfers at the lower end of the distribution. A main characteristic of the inequality measures in the generalized entropy class is that they can be additively decomposed. In other words, these measures allow to disentangle total inequality over individuals belonging to several groups into inequality between these groups and inequality among the individuals in the different groups. More specifically, the following can be shown for our three groups case (single females is group S, females in couples is group F and males in couples is group M ):
where
µ´α is the weight of group I in the analysis, n I the number of individuals in I, µ I the mean consumption of these individuals, c I the vector of private consumption levels of the individuals belonging to group I and c I is an n I -vector where each element equals µ I .
In the table below, inequality measures are given for α equal to -1, 0 and 1. All three inequality measures indicate that overall inequality decreased after the tax reform. This decrease is partly due to the decrease of the between group inequality I α (c S , c F , c M ). In addition, the inequality among single females I α (c S ), among females in couples I α (c F ) and among men in couples I α (c M ) is decreased after the tax reform. In the above inequality analysis, we focused on the distribution of the cake, rather than on the size. However, we can also compare the pre and post reform distributions of individual consumption by means of social evaluation functions, which are functions of both mean consumption and an appropriate inequality index (see, e.g., Lambert, 2001 ). Here, we focus on a social evaluation function that is based on Theil's normalized entropy measure:
where I * 1 (c) = I 1 (c) log n . Both an increase in mean consumption and a decrease in inequality positively affect social welfare W . If we apply (21) to the pre and post reform consumption distributions, we obtain a social welfare of respectively 297.47 and 305.38. Consequently, the tax reform seems to have a positive impact on social welfare. 12 
Conclusion
In this paper, a new methodology is presented to estimate a discrete choice model for female labour supply. The model is cast in the collective setting and is fairly general in that it allows for both nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation. Identification of the model is obtained by the crucial assumption that preferences of females in couples equal those of single females. By means of this assumption, both females' preferences and the rule governing the sharing of total household consumption, as a function of the earning capacity of the female, are econometrically identifiable. This feature is rather important, since it allows to take into consideration intrahousehold distributional issues, on top of standard interhousehold ones.
The model is applied to Belgian microdata and is used to evaluate the 2001 Tax Reform Act. This tax reform incorporates some important changes of the pre reform tax system. Two types of theoretical restrictions are implied by the specific model we use. A first restriction is linked to the collective setting and is not rejected by the data. Since identification is obtained by the equal preferences assumption, the model also implies some standard unitary restrictions. The latter, however, are rejected when confronted with the data. As to the sharing rule, the earning capacity of females seems to have a significantly estimated positive impact on the share in total household consumption that is shifted to the woman.
The impact of the tax reform on hours and participation is rather moderate, with a reduction of about -3.75% of aggregate labour supply of females in couples and -0.3% for single women. Further, the tax reform implies a strict Pareto improvement for 84% of the couples in the sample. For the other households, the tax reform is beneficial to one of the household members, while the other is worse off. Note that such results, which refer to the intrahousehold allocation of welfare, cannot be obtained in the standard unitary approach to household labour supply.
Although the obtained results are not entirely satisfactory due to the rejection of some behaviourial restrictions, the approach shows its relevance in analysing changes in fiscal policy. The study has its limitations however. To increase its empirical relevance, the model should be generalized so that it can adequately deal with external effects and the presence of children in the household. In order to retain an econometrically identifiable model, preferences will probably need to be restricted in one way or another (e.g., Beckerian caring preferences, see Chiappori, 1988 Chiappori, , 1992 . A second limitation of the study at hand is that it does not take into account elements of household public consumption. A large share of total household means, however, is spent on goods with a public consumption component, such as rent or heating. Two recent studies which deal with household public consumption in a different way are Lewbel, Chiappori and Browning (2001) and Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir (2002) . Finally, the model does not incorporate household production (see Rees, 1997 and Chiappori, 1997) . The simple dichotomy between market time and leisure may be an inadequate assumption in modelling household labour supply. The increasing availability of time budget studies may enhance the empirical modelling of household labour supply incorporating household production.
